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Ontario's Bill 167 
Reform of the Status Quo 
John Crispo 
This paper reviews the amendments mode in 1970 io 
the Ontario Labour Relations Act, explains their consé-
quences and comments on some of the serious omissions 
of the Bill 167. 
Ontario's long-awaited législation, to up-date its Labour Relations 
Act, was introduced in the Provincial Législature on June 22, 1970 
and finally proclaimed on February 15, 1971. Although the basic thrust 
of Bill 167 was hardly revolutionary, it has generated a good deal of 
controversy, particularly as it applies to the construction industry. 
With the latter exception, Bill 167 can perhaps best be described 
as reform of the status quo. Aside from its possible impact on construction 
industrial relations, the Bill should do little to alter the présent situation. 
That is was not intended to do so may be attributed in large measure to 
the central conclusion of a spécial Department of Labour committee 
that was charged with drafting the Bill. The committee apparently felt 
that « while there was need for important improvements, the basic structure 
of the collective bargaining System was fundamentally sound » i. 
Although this assessment is basically the same as that of many other 
récent inquiries into the state of industrial relations in Canada (see 
below), the resulting reforms in the législation are not as drastic as those 
called for elsewhere. However, this 
distinction may be less attributable 
to the thinking of the aforemention-
ed committee than to excess caution 
on the part of the Government. 
1 « Bill 167, T> Task, Toronto, Ontario Département of Labour, Vol. 6, No. 1, 
March, 1971, p. 5. 
CRISPO, John, Acting Director, 
School of Business, Director, Centre 
for Industrial Relations, Professor, 
Department of Political Economy, 
University of Toronto, ONT. 
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After reviewing the background against which Bill 167 emerged, 
this paper reviews both the gênerai amendments that were introduced 
and the particular, and potentially more farreaching, revisions directed 
towards improvements in industrial relations in the construction industry. 
Following a brief commentary on some of the serious omissions in the 
Bill, the article then concludes with some observations concerning the 
failure of the Bill to go further than it did. 
BACKGROUND AND GENERAL PERSPECTIVE 
Turbulence on the Canadian industrial relations scène is not a new 
phenomenon. None the less, it has appeared to intensif y over the past 
décade, and for that reason has received more public scrutiny. Because 
of hostile public reaction to the level of strikes and settlements, one might 
even say that industrial relations hâve been under attack for some rime now. 
Reflecting this critical environment, a number of inquiries hâve been 
held into the state of industrial relations in various parts of Canada. 
The reports of three of thèse investigations received careful considération 
by those responsible for drafting Bill 167. Aside from Ontario's own 
Rand Report2, thèse were the Woods Report3, at the fédéral level, and 
the Goldenberg-Crispo study4, commissioned by the Canadian Construc-
tion Association as a centennial project. 
Except for the Rand Report, the author of which was obviously 
very much influenced by Australia's industrial relations System, thèse 
reports were not radical either in their diagnoses or in their prescriptions. 
Each is based on the conclusion that Canada's présent collective bargaining 
system is basically sound, if for no other reason than the lack of a viable 
alternative. In this sensé, again with the possible exception of the Rand 
Report, thèse treatises did not reflect the degree of public disquiet that 
has been abroad in the land. 
Fortunately or unfortunately, depending on one's point of view, the 
Government of Ontario was apparently moved even less by this disquiet. 
2
 Ivan C. RAND, Royal Commission Inquiry into Labour Disputes, Toronto, 
Queen's Printer, 1968, 263 pp. 
3 A.W.R. CARROTHERS, John CRISPO, Gérard DION and H.D. WOODS, 
Canadian Industrial Relations : The Report of the Task Force on Labour Relations, 
Ottawa, Queen's Printer, 1969, 250 pp. 
4 H. Cari GOLDENBERG and John CRISPO (eds). Construction Labour 
Relations, Ottawa, Canadian Construction Association, 1968, 670 pp. 
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Indeed, the Government seems to hâve been quite unimpressed by this 
or any other variable, since it failed to go nearly as far as the three reports 
in question would hâve had it go. As already indicated, a possible explana-
tion of the Government's more cautious approach is offered in the 
conclusion. 
Not surprisingly, the perspective that the author brings to bear in 
this paper reflects his expérience as a member of the Prime Minister's 
Task Force on Labour Relations, hereinafter referred to as the Task 
Force. Although the author is quite prepared to acknowledge the merits 
of certain criticisms of some aspects of the Task Force analysis, he still 
feels that it represents a useful frame of référence against which to assess 
on-going public policy developments. 
It should also be noted that this article is being written prior to many 
of the new provisions of the Act coming before the Ontario Labour 
Relations Board for application and interprétation. One's ultimate judg-
ment of the new Bill must obviously await ils actual implementation. 
Although there are certainly technical problems that remain to be worked 
out as the revised Act is brought into force, this paper is written by a 
layman who has studiously avoided ail such considérations. 
GENERAL AMENDMENTS 
Most of the amendments introduced by Bill 167 apply to industry 
in gênerai. Thèse changes can conveniently be analyzed under the follow-
ing headings : Coverage, Certification and Decertification, Union member-
ship Rights, Enforcement, Emergency Disputes, and Other Recommenda-
tions. 
Coverage 
Although in some ways more symbolic than real, one of the most 
disappointing features about Bill 167 is its failure to extend bargaining 
rights to more groups not now covered by the Ontario Labour Relations 
Act. Although employed professionnal engineers were added to the Act's 
coverage just before its. third reading, the remaining professional exclusions 
were left intact. The Act will also continue to exclude agricultural workers, 
as well as, by interprétation at least, most own-account workers or 
dépendent contractors, such as taxi drivers. 
Failure to expand the scope of the Act to thèse and other groups not 
only ignores one of the basic Task Force recommendations, but also the 
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spirit, if not the letter, of the new preamble to the législation, which 
asserts : 
Whereas it is in the public interest of the Province of Ontario to 
further harmonious relations between employers and employées by 
encouraging the practice and procédure of collective bargaining 
between employers and trade unions as the freely designated repré-
sentatives of employées . . . 
Apparently the traditions of certain groups and the vested interests 
of others combined to induce the Government of Ontario to préserve 
certain anachronisms hardly consistent with the philosophy its newly-
amended législation purports to adopt. 
Certification and Decertification 
Before turning to the most significant changes brought in under 
this heading, two related amendments are worth noting. The first relates 
to the right of access by union organizers to workers employed and 
housed on lands under the control of their employer. Such access may 
now be secured by application to the Board, which will deal with each 
case on its merits, including, presumably, the terms and conditions under 
which such access is to be granted, if at ail. 
Also noteworthy is a new provision which seemingly bars an employer, 
without union consent, from altering any terms and conditions of employ-
ment after an application for certification has been filed. This is consistent 
with the view running through the législation and its administration, which 
holds that, in deciding whether to choose the collective bargaining route, 
employées should base their décision on the employer's past performance 
rather than on any last-minute improvements he may choose to introduce 
in order to forestall their unionization. 
With respect to the degrees of support required for certification 
purposes, Bill 167 embodies most of the Task Force proposais. Thus it 
will now take only 35, instead of 45, per cent support to gain a certification 
vote. At the other end of the spectrum, the Act now requires 65, instead of 
55, per cent support to achieve certification without a vote. In the event 
of such a ballot, a union now need secure 50 per cent support of those 
voting, rather than of those eligible to vote. Ail thèse changes are in 
keeping with the notion not only that certification ballots should be more 
readily available, but also that in most cases they represent the most 
accurate way of determining the actual views of the employées. 
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The unions are most agitâted about raising the requirement for 
certification without a vote from 55 to 65 per cent. The author lias more 
sympathy with this concern than when he was a Task Force member, 
largely because he is now more aware of the kinds of pressures un-
scrupulous employers can bring to bear in relatively small firms, especially 
where there is a significant ethnie component in the labour force. It 
should also be remembered that labour relations acts are intended to 
promote collective bargaining where workers so désire, through trade 
unions of their choice. This considération, plus the désire to encourage 
some stability in industrial relations, doubtless explains why the proportion 
required to secure a decertification or termination-of-bargaining-rights 
vote was maintained at 50 per cent, despite its réduction to 35 per cent 
on the certification side. 
Another intriguing change empowers the Board to order one or more 
votes where more than one union is involved in an attempt to secure 
the right of exclusive représentation for a particular group of workers. 
This is intended to provide the Board with sufficient discrétion to ascertain 
the true wishes of a group of workers with respect to their future relations 
with their employer. 
Union Membership Rights 
Bill 167 adds some new areas to those in which union members 
are already protected from running afoul of their unions, at least to the 
extent of preventing a worker's discharge solely because he bas been 
expelled from his union. Although a step in the right direction, thèse 
extensions still fall well short of the comprehensive union membership 
bill of rights recommended by the Task Force. The basic flaw lies in the 
Bill's failure to corne to grips with the challenge of ensuring certain 
minimal rights of union citizenship as well as employment. None the 
less, in addition to having the right to belong to another trade union and 
to engage in activities against an existing union, or on behalf of another 
one, union members are now to be protected from discharge if they engage 
in reasonable dissent within a trade union, are discriminated against by 
a trade union in the application of its membership rules, or refuse to pay 
unreasonable initiation fées, dues or other assessments. 
Thèse changes clearly leave much to the discrétion of the Board, 
and considérable clarification will be required before their full import 
can be determined. Generously interpreted, they could go a long way 
towards providing union members with meaningful protection as workers, 
although not as union members. Because of this very real distinction, 
the author would still prefer the more direct and open assault on the 
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problem advocated by the Task Force. One thing Bill 167 does establish, 
however, is that where unions improperly press employers to discharge 
workers contrary to the provisions of the Bill, the unions involved, rather 
than the employers, will be liable for any resulting damages. 
A most contentious aspect of the Bill relates to the opportunity it 
affords those with religious objections to apply to the Board for an 
exemption from union dues. In the event the Board upholds such a 
request, an équivalent amount is to be donated to a charity mutually 
agreed upon by the individual and the union in question, or named by 
the Board in the event of their failure to agrée. Although available only 
to those already employed in a plant where there is compulsory payment 
of union dues, this approach has a great deal of appeal as a matter of 
principle. The problem is that it could readily lend itself to abuse if the 
Board does not exercise extrême caution in its administration. 
As recommended by the Task Force, unions also hâve a duty under 
the new législation to provide fair représentation for those in their bar-
gaining units. Hère again, much will dépend on the Board's interprétation 
of the meaning of fair représentation. Actually the Act itself does not 
refer to fair représentation except in a marginal note, but rather precludes 
a union's « acting in a manner that is arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad 
faith ». Particularly in the latter part of this phraseology, there is a close 
similarity between the language in the new Act and that in one of the 
leading U.S. cases5. Presumably, therefore, the Board will be able to 
draw on American jurisprudence for guidance in this area. 
Another interesting feature of the new Bill, inspired at least in part 
by the Task Force, relates to its provisions with respect to ratification and 
strike votes. Prior to Bill 167, the législation required that if a union 
chose to take a strike vote it should be by secret ballot. Under the new 
législation, unions that choose to utilize ratification or strike votes must 
take them not only by secret ballot but in a manner designed to ensure 
the membership in question « ample opportunity to cast their ballots ». 
As worthwhile as thèse changes appear to be, it remains to be seen how 
they will be enforced and what will happen in the event a union does not 
act in compliance with the requirements on a particular vote. 
An interesting twist on some of the Rand Report thinking is reflected 
in the amendment providing for the right of strikers, upon unconditional 
written application for re-instatement on mutually agreeable terms that 
do not discriminate against the individuals in question, to return to their 
5 Vaca v. Sipes, 55 L.C., Par. 11, 731. 
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jobs, up to six months after the commencement of a légal strike, as long 
as there is work available. Aside from the potential administrative com-
plexities inhérent in such an approach, the most intriguing aspect of this 
measure is that it stands condemned by both union and management 
spokesmen, albeit for différent reasons. Union leaders see it as an entice-
ment to union membership dissension and to strike-breaking, while 
corporate leaders object to the inhibiting effect it could hâve on their 
ability to recruit replacements for striking employées. As a sometime cynic, 
the author finds himself tending to favour this innovation, if only because 
both union and management seem so opposed. 
Although the Government was undoubtedly motivated in its thinking 
on this issue largely by a désire to dispel the fear of permanent loss of 
employment, which adds such an emotional and sometimes violent over-
tone to picket-line activities in protracted strikes, the eventual impact of 
this change remains to be seen. If nothing else, it should be of some aid 
and comfort to individual workers who find themselves caught up in 
strikes contrary to their better judgment and occasionally against their 
will. 
Enforcement 
Bill 167 also strengthens the enforcement provisions in the Act in 
a number of ways. Perhaps the most important change in this respect is 
the amendment making it illégal to threaten an unlawful strike or lockout, 
although once again there is bound to be some confusion about thèse 
proscriptions until the Board begins to apply them. Like other forms of 
prohibited conduct in the législation, thèse proscriptions could take on 
considérable significance, if only because fines under the Act hâve been 
raised ten-fold. At their maximum levels, thèse fines are now $1,000 for 
individuals and $10,000 for corporations and trade unions. 
In terms of more private forms of enforcement, arbitration boards 
may now be constituted and may award damages against a union or 
employer that calls or authorizes an illégal strike or lockout before a 
collective bargaining régime has corne into effect. Such a remedy is avail-
able, however, only after the Board has declared that a union or employer 
has called or authorized an illégal strike or lockout. Since the Board has 
seldom, if ever, issued such a déclaration after a strike or lockout has been 
terminated, this in itself could pose an interesting policy conundrum, 
unless there is a complète reversai of past policy in this area. 
Emergency Disputes 
One of the most encouraging aspects of Bill 167 is to be found in the 
résistance by the Government of Ontario to the politically popular resort 
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to standing powers of compulsory arbitration prévalent in British Colum-
bia and, until recently, in Saskatchewan. The Government did include a 
provision for establishing industrial inquiry commissions, but this is of 
little or no real significance. What is important is that the Government 
has kept itself in an extremely flexible position, thus leaving labour and 
management in considérable doubt as to what it may do in the event of 
a dispute that truly jeopardizes the health, welfare and safety of the 
community. In keeping with this thus far successful strategy, the Govern-
ment did not go along with the Task Force idea of a Public Interest 
Disputes Commission, or with the notion of a specifically spelled-out 
choice-of-procedures amendment. Any chagrin the author may feel in 
this regard is more than offset by his relief at the Government's avoid-
ance of anything like the Rand Report proposais in this area, which were 
overly influenced by a rose-coloured view of Australia's so-called com-
pulsory arbitration System. Unfortunately, however, by failling to rescind 
existing législation such as the Hospital Labour Disputes Arbitration Act 
— which does call for the imposition of automatic compulsory arbitration 
in the event of an impasse — the Government did not follow through 
completely on its admirable approach to dispute settlement. Consistent 
with its over-all philosophy, however, is the introduction of procédures 
whereby the Province's compulsory one-or-two-step conciliation machinery 
can be brought into play earlier, thereby making it more likely that the 
parties will be free to take direct action as of the termination of their 
existing agreement. 
Other Changes 
A number of other amendments were passed, only a few of which 
merit mention. One gives the Board the power to treat two or more firms 
as one, for certification and other purposes, where piercing of the cor-
porate veil reveals they are really joint ventures or at least under common 
control and direction. Another change reverses the effect of a Suprême 
Court ruling that barred arbitrâtes from modifying disciplinary penalties 
unless specifically authorized to do so under the collective agreements 
the terms of which they were adjudicating. As in the past, arbitrators 
may now vary such penalties, except where the collective agreement in 
question actually delineates them. A third revision makes it clear that 
in the event of a successor firm or union, the existing collective agreement 
survives, unless, on application, the Board decrees otherwise. 
CONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS 
As indicated earlier, the most controversial parts of Bill 167 are the 
amendments that were introduced in an attempt to improve labour-
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management relations in the construction industry. Before reviewing thèse 
changes, many of which reflect, at-least in part, the author's thinking 
on this subject, some of the reasoning behind the gênerai concern about 
construction industrial relations should be highlighted. 
For some time now the author has been of the opinion that there 
is a serious imbalance of power in the construction industry in favour 
of organized labour. Reflecting this and other equally undesirable cir-
cumstances, construction industrial relations could almost be said to hâve 
gone from bad to worse over the past décade or so. In the process they 
hâve had a deleterious effect on the gênerai state of industrial relations. 
The author's overview of this situation is summarized in the foïïowing 
extract from a présentation before the Ontario Standing Committee on 
Labour, when it was holding hearings on Bill 167 : 
To me there is at présent no greater challenge to the préservation 
or our over-all collective bargaining system than its chaotic state in 
the construction industry. Both procedurally and substantively, the 
results of the collective bargaining process in that industry are in-
tolérable. Procedurally, there are both protracted légal strikes and/or 
lockouts, and short but damaging illégal strikes, over everything from 
récognition to jurisdictional disputes. Substantively, there are wage 
settlements so far out of line in relation to any reasonable criteria 
that there is no rhyme or reason to them, save and except for the 
excessive imbalance of power that plagues the industry. 
The costs of the situation are incalculable : it isn't just the lost time 
or the exorbitant settlements ; it goes far beyond thèse things. It is 
contributing to a rise in construction costs that procludes society 
from meeting so many vital unmet public needs. . . It is setting 
impossible wage précédents, and unduly upsetting long-established 
wage and salary relationships. And finally, in the process of ail of 
this, it is aggravating what are already difficult enough bargaining 
relationships in ail sorts of other industries. 
Given this orientation, it should hardly be surprising that the author 
chastised the Government for not going far enough in its construction 
amendments. Bill 167 in no way cornes to grips with the restrictionist 
supply policies that many of the building trades unions doubtless pursue 
through their varying degrees of control over both the hiring and apprent-
iceship Systems in the industry. The Goldenberg-Crispo and Task Force 
reports both called for substantially more public control over thèse facets 
of construction industrial relations. Nor does the Bill compel multi-trade 
bargaining or empower the Board to order it when in its view the circum-
stances so warrant. 
The Bill does provide for contractor-association accréditation, but 
not a firm enough basis to rectify the imbalance of power that persists in 
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the industry. Before elaborating on this point, it should be made clear 
that contractor-association accréditation is simply the équivalent, on the 
employer side, of union certification on the employée side. The Bill 
provides for such accréditation within appropriate géographie areas, 
industrial sectors, and crafts or trades, provided the applicant association 
can demonstrate that it is supported by a majority of the unionized con-
tractors involved, and that they in turn account for a majority of the union-
ized employées in the unit in question. Needless to say, the very imple-
mentation of this scheme is going to pose some intriguing problems. 
Although the Bill bars individual contractors from making oral or 
written side, tie-in or « sweetheart » deals with any union once they are 
covered by an accredited unit, it still will not solve the problem. This is 
because the Bill does not provide for compulsory membership in accredited 
associations, nor absolutely proscribe contractors' abandoning their asso-
ciations and operating during a strike or lockout, which is, of course, a 
key variable in the unions' traditional « divide and conquer » tactics. 
Without the power to force the collective taking of a strike or lockout, 
accredited contractors' associations will be almost as vulnérable as their 
unaccredited counterparts today to the short-sighted, self-seeking éléments 
within their ranks. 
Despite the basic inadequacy of its major construction provision, 
Bill 167 does include some changes that should help alleviate the industry's 
problems. One provision, that has incurred the wrath of the building 
trades unions, calls for the certification of mixed crews under appropriate 
circumstances, something which is anathema to those with a craft union 
mentality. Another amendment makes it clear that the Board has the 
power to résolve jurisdictional disputes, whether or not the contractor 
or contractors involved hâve in their employ members of each of the 
contending union groups. A related amendment facilitâtes the Board's 
handling of installation disputes where industrial as well as craft unions 
are involved. 
To conclude this section of the paper, it is only fair to point out that 
the author is no longer sure that anything less than compulsory province-
wide multi-trade bargaining will solve the chaos that is construction labour 
relations. Perhaps the thought of a global confrontation of this dimension 
would begin to bring things under control. At least, if it were total, such 
a confrontation would reduce the unions' ability to rely on so-called 
strikes — possibly non-strikes would be a better term — in one area 
while their members from that area work elsewhere for the duration of 
the conflict. Only one thing is clear : something more drastic than Bill 
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167's construction amendments will be required before any lasting solution 
to the problems of labour relations in the construction industry is going 
to émerge. 
BASIC OMISSIONS 
Space will permit of only passing référence to a number of significant 
changes that should hâve been introduced by Bill 167. Already mentioned 
has been the failure to extend the scope of the Act to ail manner of 
employed and quasi-employed individuals. Equally, if not more disturbing, 
was the failure to produce a comprehensive picketing and boycotting code. 
Despite the constitutional and légal niceties involved, it is time législatures 
in Canada decided, as a matter of stated public policy, precisely what the 
rules of industrial warfare are to be. The Bill also fails to grant the Board 
more gênerai powers in a number of areas where it would be salutary to 
do so. As an example, the Board should hâve wider discrétion in the 
détermination and redetermination of bargaining units. As another illustra-
tion, its power to issue direction and compliance orders should not be 
confined to the construction industry. Consistent with its growing quasi-
judicial rôle, the Board should also hâve been converted into an entirely 
neutral board by removing the partisan labour and management sidemen, 
except perhaps as assessors. 
CONCLUSION 
The author's disappointment with Bill 167 is heightened by the 
realization that it is only every décade or so that the Government and 
the Législature of Ontario appear to engage in a thorough review of public 
policy in the field of industrial relations. Perhaps past and current failures 
to rise to this challenge can be attributed to two inter-related considér-
ations. 
The first concerns the attitudes of labour and management. Despite 
their disparate and well publicized complaints about alleged inequities 
in the présent rules of the game, it may well be that they are not that 
eager to see any basic changes. Such caution could be attributed to their 
awareness of the politicians' instinctive désire to avoid unduly offending 
either side in this highly charged area of inter-group conflict. As a resuit, 
both labour and management may be of the view that what the politicians 
grant to, or take away from, one side will be offset by additions to, or 
extractions from, the other. Assuming this to be the case, the only out-
come to be expected is a pot-pourri of political compromises the net 
resuit of which no one could hope to predict in advance. The risks being 
so great and the outcome being so uncertain, nobody could blâme either 
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labour or management, or both, for preferring to deal with the devil they 
know than with one they don't. 
Second, and in large measure responsible for the first considération, 
is the feeling one has that politicians are remarkably insensitive to the 
public interest in the field of industrial relations. Possibly this is because 
successful politicians are essentially power brokers, and the power dealers 
in this instance are labour and management, not the public. Thus the 
public interest in collective bargaining is usually neglected until there is 
a crisis. At that point, ad hoc panic measures may be brought into play 
to salvage the situation. Adéquate as thèse may be to the immédiate pro-
blem, they are no substitute for appropriate changes in the over-all public 
policy framework for the conduct of industrial relations. 
In ail too many jurisdictions, one is left with the distinct impression 
that politics has priority over the public interest. Bill 167 reflects this 
phenomenon, although not as badly as it might hâve. For one thing, the 
Government avoided the type of ad hoc panic measures referred to above. 
Moreover, although the Bill did not go far enough in a number of respects, 
it not only made progress in several areas, but also revealed an awareness 
of some of the major problems in other areas. In this latter sensé, 
especially, the Government's position was far more responsible than that 
of either of the opposition parties, both of which appeared so eager to 
cultivate the so-called labour vote that they did not even seem willing to 
acknowledge the existence of any serious problems, requiring drastic 
remédies, even in the construction industry. 
La réforme de la législation du travail en Ontario (1970) 
Les modifications apportées à la Loi des relations ouvrières de l'Ontario pro-
mulguées le 15 février 1971 ont suscité pas mal de discussions, mais elles sont loin 
d'être révolutionnaiers. Il s'agit, au mieux, d'une réforme à l'intérieur d'un statu quo. 
Dans son travail, le législateur s'est assez peu inspiré des recommandations des 
trois commissions d'enquête qui se sont penchées sur le problème des relations pro-
fessionnelles au cours des années passées. 
En quoi consistent ces changements ? En des modifications d'ordre général et 
dans une tentative de réaménagement du régime des rapports collectifs de travail 
dans l'industrie de la construction. 
MODIFICATIONS D'ORDRE GÉNÉRAL 
Le législateur n'a à peu près pas touché au champ d'application de la loi, si 
ce n'est de permettre le droit de négocation aux ingénieurs professionnels. En cette 
matière, il a manqué d'audace. 
Pour ce qui est des questions relatives à l'accréditation, la loi est modifiée 
de façon à prévoir un vote de représentativité automatique si le syndicat compte 
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dans ses rangs trente-cinq pour cent des travailleurs compris dans un groupe et si 
le nombre de ses membres ne dépasse pas soixante-cinq pour cent. L'exigence d*une 
majorité d'au moins soixante-cinq pour cent pour l'émission d'un certificat sans la 
tenue d'un vote peut entraver le progrès du syndicalisme dans la petite et la moy-
enne entreprise où l'employeur jouit d'une plus grande influence auprès de ses 
employés. Par ailleurs, dorénavant, il suffira aux syndicats de détenir la majorité 
absolue parmi les votants et non plus parmi les personnes habiles à voter. Par 
ailleurs, dans le cas des votes tenus en matière de révocation d'accréditation, le 
législateur a maintenu la règle de la majorité. 
Le législateur a aussi cherché, par certaines modifications, à protéger les tra-
vailleurs contre les abus des syndicats. La loi semble donner une plus grande liberté 
d'action aux travailleurs, mais il se peut qu'elle manque de sanctions. Tout dépendra 
de la façon dont la Commission des relations du travail interprétera ces dispositions 
nouvelles. Le privilège que la loi donne aux travailleurs d'être dispensés d'appartenir 
à un syndicat pour des motifs d'ordre religieux peut soulever bien des problèmes ; 
et, au surplus, il s'agit d'une question de principe majeure. 
Les changements touchant la tenue des votes de grève s'inspire partiellement 
du Rapport Woods en exigeant le scrutin secret d'une part et, d'autre pari:, en pré-
voyant des dispositions qui facilitent le vote des travailleurs, mais ici encore il reste 
à voir comment elles seront appliquées. Inspirées de la pensée du Rapport Rand cette 
fois, le droit accordé aux grévistes de reprendre leur emploi sans discrimination sur 
demande écrite dans les six mois qui suivent la déclaration d'une grève légale. 
Syndicats et employeurs se sont opposés à cette modification pour des motifs diffé-
rents. 
Le gouvernement a résisté aux pressions qui l'incitaient à imposer l'arbitrage 
obligatoire comme on l'a fait en Colombie Britannique et en Saskatchewan en met-
tant de côté sur ce point les recommandations du Rapport Rand, mais il est regret-
table que l'on n'ait pas mis en place une commission chargée de veiller à l'intérêt 
du public. 
L'INDUSTRIE DE LA CONSTRUCTION 
Les modifications qui touchent les relations du travail dans l'industrie de la 
construction ont été les plus âprement discutées. Les changements qu'on a apportées 
ici, et qui prévoient principalement l'accréditation des associations d'employeurs et 
l'interdiction de contrats collectifs écrits ou verbaux entre les employeurs et les 
syndicats non accrédités, ne sont pas suffisants pour atténuer les problèmes propres 
et très graves de cette industrie où la puissance des syndicats est trop grande et 
où le public est le grand perdant. Que faut-il pour faire disparaître le chaos dans 
lequel se débat cette industrie ? La négociation sur une base provinciale peut-être. 
OBSERVATIONS D'ENSEMBLE 
Le bill 167 pèche par omission. Il a négligé d'étendre à de nombreux groupes 
d'employés ou d'artisans (quasi-employed) les avantages de la loi. Il n'a pas touché 
à la commission dont le rôle devient de plus en plus celui d'un organisme quasi 
judiciaire. Il n'a rien tenté pour établir un code d'éthique en matière de piquetage. 
D'une façon générale, le législateur a été guidé par la prudence, une prudence qui a 
tué toute audace. Et il s'ensuit que les politiciens sont insensibles à l'intérêt public 
dans le champ des relations professionnelles. 
